In the United States a common legal consequence of the commission of crime is forfeiture of property used to violate the law. Confiscation of an automobile used to smuggle drugs is a typical example. In most cases the function of forfeiture is either to punish criminals or to prevent further use of the property in crime. Forfeiture statutes are closely connected with the criminal law and ought to be analysed with that branch of law, but in the United States forfeiture law has achieved an existence wholly apart from criminal law. That separate existence is attributable to an historical accident in the 19th century when forfeiture came to be thought an exclusively civil sanction necessarily imposed in an in rem action. 1 This characterization focused attention on the property and tended to obscure the relation between the property forfeited and the criminal involvement of its owner. For the last half century the question whether government may permissibly take citizens' property in a forfeiture action has been determined by a single considerationwhether the property has been used in unlawful activity. 2 This simplification of the question of forfeiture has caused many unjust confiscations. Owners guilty of only minor infractions have sometimes been subjected to disproportionate forfeitures. 3 Wholly innocent owners have frequently lost their property when someone else, without their knowledge, used the property to commit crime. 4 [Vol. 27
Again and again owners have unsuccessfully raised constitutional objections to confiscation of property without compensation. American courts have most frequently replied with an analogy to the medieval law of deodand, in which they find the origin of modern enactments. 5 The deodand was the instrument of a man's death; it was forfeit as "guilty property" regardless of the owner's culpability.6 This fiction has allowed most American courts to avoid analysis of forfeiture. It is probably not the principal reason our courts have resisted constitutional challenges; rather, they have allowed far reaching confiscations because of the remedial purposes seen to be served by some forfeitures: the principal idea is that taking the property prevents its future illegal use. 7 American courts have tended to neglect the punitive side of forfeiture, since punishment seems inconsistent with an in rem action. 8 In the last fifteen years some American courts have subjected modern forfeiture statutes to closer scrutiny. Five federal courts and three state supreme courts have held forfeiture statutes unconstitutional on substantive grounds. 9 Four other state supreme courts have avoided constitutional attacks by narrow statutory construction. 1o In 1974 the United States Supreme Court slowed the trend against forfeiture in the federal courts by reversing a three judge district court that had found one statute unconstitutional.ll use incurs forfeiture. Combining the two forms of liability means that an automobile can be confiscated where neither the owner nor the driver knows of the unlawful use. See e.g., United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Auto., 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1957) (ordering forfeiture where passenger carried 1/3Oth ounce marijuana without driver's knowledge).
5. "It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. " The Court nevertheless encouraged a limited reform of the law by recognizing that "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner ... [who] had done all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property."12 In the state courts the trend against forfeiture has continued. 13 Congress has also created a need to reconsider forfeiture law. In 1972 it amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to require that "criminal forfeitures" (as contrasted to "civil forfeitures") be imposed in criminal prosecution of the owner.14 Congress did not specify what constitutes a criminal forfeiture. Taking these events of recent years together, it is clear that American courts must now fully reassess forfeiture law.
With few precedents to guide them, American courts will of necessity move slowly in their reconsideration. That reconsideration could be expedited if a systematic exposition of forfeiture and constitutional principles could be found. The dearth of American analysis suggests considering the approaches of other legal systems.
In Germany, legal scholarship in the field of forfeiture is extensive. Germany has long had forfeiture provisions comparable to our own. With the adoption of the American-inspired West German constitution, German scholars, judges, and legislators acted to modify their law, including its forfeiture provisions, to bring it into accord with strengthened constitutional guarantees. In the two decades between 1949 and 1968 German lawyers have dealt at length with the same problems now facing American forfeiture law. I5 GERMAN FORFEITURE STATUTES § 40 of the German Criminal Code of 1871 mandated that " [ 0 ] bjects produced by a deliberate felony or misdemeanor, or used or intended for committing a deliberate felony or misdemeanor, may be forfeited if they belong to the principal perpetrator or an accomplice."16 § 40 remained essentially unchanged until superseded in 12 Since the enactment of § 40 in 1871, German scholarship has begun consideration of forfeiture by looking to its legal nature. Early commentators argued that all forfeitures were alike; some saw forfeitures as exclusively punishments, others considered them to be exclusively preventive measures. 27 By about the turn of the century however, both earlier views were rejected. Courts and commentators then recognized that there were two different types of forfeiture, one type serving as punishment, the other as a preventive measure. 28 This view of forfeiture as "ambivalent" has been almost universally held in German law ever since. 29 Disagreement has centered on how one distinguishes the punitive forfeiture from the preventive.
The [Vol. 27 commentators largely adhered to this position. 31 Nevertheless, for constitutional purposes, the Federal Supreme Court chose to look to the underlying nature of the sanction. The Court admitted the punitive nature of certain third-party forfeitures and thereby recognized a new classification, the so-called "punishment-like" forfeiture. 32 Since the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949 the characterization of the legal nature of forfeiture has assumed increased importance. The classification as punitive or preventive is a fundamental first step in constitutional analysis. A given forfeiture must satisfy the constitutional requirements of one classification or the other. A forfeiture which is valid neither as a punishment nor as a measure to protect society is unconstitutional. Greater emphasis on the punitive/preventive classification has resulted in courts and commentators reformulating the distinguishing test. The "essence and purpose" of the sanction are decisive. If the statute looks to the actor, if it is directed toward atonement for past wrong, the forfeiture is punitive, or, at least "punishment-like." If the statute looks to the property without regard to the guilt of the actor, if it contemplates resisting a danger to the community, then it is preventive. 33 Therefore punitive forfeiture is subjective and past-directed, whereas preventive forfeiture is objective and future-directed. Actor-related criteria are characteristic of punitive forfeitures, while property-related criteria are typical of preventive forfeitures. 34 41 In America, not only is such a "relation back" possible, but our courts have construed it as characteristic of all forfeiture statutes. 42 Generally, in German law, an owner not subject to punishment in his person cannot be subject to punishment in his property. Thus a punitive forfeiture will not be permissible if the owner is dead, insane, or otherwise legally not subject to prosecution. 43 The 1968 reform act largely codified these results.
The Property Guarantee
It is undisputed that a forfeiture imposed as punishment, [Vol. 27 though uncompensated, does not violate constitutional protections of property.44 Art. 14 of the Basic Law guarantees the right of property: property may not be taken, except for the public good and by a law providing for appropriate compensation. 45 Though it is agreed that forfeiture may be imposed as punishment without providing compensation, there is no general agreement as to the exact theoretical source of this constitutional exception. 46 The Federal Supreme Court has adopted a theory that the greater includes the lesser, that is, if the state may punish the guilty actor in his personal freedom, it may also punish him in his property.47
The Proportionality Principle
German forfeitures must also conform to proportionality principles. The proportionality principle (Grundsatz der verhaltnismassigkeit) is a natural corollary to the guilt principle. Where the guilt principle demands blameworthiness as a necessary prerequisite to punishment, the proportionality principle requires that punishment not be disproportionate to blameworthiness (Schuld).48 Recognition of the constitutional rank of the proportionality principle in the early 1950s had a special effect on earlier German statutes that had placed forfeiture outside the trial judge's discretion and required forfeiture in all instances. The Federal Supreme Court held that the proportionality principle requires the trial judge to examine the spe- 46. Some see the property as placed outside constitutional protection by virtue of an unwritten constitutional provision. See Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 29; Eser at 150-55; Stree, supra n. 41 at 87. Others contend that punitive forfeiture is an expropriation within the meaning of Art. 14, but one that does not require compensation. See Eser at 155-56; Stree, supra n. 41 at 88-90. Finally, many would find support for the sanction in one of the two clauses in Art. 14 limiting the right of property, either Art. 14 ~ 1 cl. 2 or Art. 14 ~ 2. See Dietrichs, supra n. 27 at 30; Eser at 166-73; Stree, supra n. 41 at 85-90. cific situation before him for the degree of blameworthiness of the owner and for the harshness of the forfeiture. If the actor's guilt is slight and the severity of the forfeiture great, the judge must deny the forfeiture, notwithstanding mandatory language in the statute. 49 American forfeitures, on the other hand, need not conform to proportionality principles, even though several state constitutions require proportionality in punishment and the federal constitution prohibits excessive fines. 5o American courts, when faced with a challenge that a forfeiture is excessive, deny that forfeiture is a punishment, and thus avoid the question of proportionality altogether. 51 In German law the proportionality principle was so widely accepted as a constitutional requirement, that the 1962 draft proposal for the new criminal code omitted any specific forfeiture proportionality principle as unnecessary.52 As for mandatory forfeiture, the constitutional requirement remains the only limitation. 53 But in the case of forfeiture placed in the discretion of the trial judge, the 1968 reform act adds the further limitation that the judge shall not order a punitive or "punishment-like" forfeiture "if it would stand out of proportion to the consequences of the [illegal] deed committed and to the blame [worthiness of the person subjected to it ]."54 Thus whether the forfeiture is mandatory or discretionary makes a difference in the standard applied. 55 Since the overwhelming trend of new enactments is to place forfeiture in the discretion of the judge,56 the more restrictive standard will increasingly be the one applicable.
Application of the proportionality principle raises a number of questions. What makes a forfeiture excessive and therefore constitutionally forbidden? It is difficult to state more than the general constitutional requirement. SchrOder considered a forfeiture to be constitutionally forbidden "if the iniquity of the deed and the actor's blameworthiness are so small, that the deprivation of the property .. would mean a disproportionate hardship."57 The statutory stan- dard of relationship of sanction to blameworthiness is even more difficult to state precisely. In general, the severity of the forfeiture must be considered in relation to the value of the object forfeit.58 The problem is complicated by the usual nature of forfeiture as an all-or-nothing sanction. Taking the entire property may be too severe, while taking nothing may be too lenient. 59 The 1968 reform act allows an intermediate, or partial, forfeiture where possible. 6o A solution may be found in what appears to be a growing consensus that the punitive forfeiture must be considered as a part of the overall punishment. 61 Thus, if the forfeiture would otherwise be too severe, it could be made permissible by an appropriate reduction in the primary sentence.
B. Third-Party Directed "Punishment-like" Forfeiture
The so-called "punishment-like" (strafahnlich) forfeiture arises when an owner, not himself a principal or an accessory to crime, is nevertheless made to suffer forfeiture of property for some degree of personal fault in allowing the property to be used illegally. The third party has not himself committed a crime; he cannot be sanctioned other than by the "punishment-like" forfeiture. Where the third party forfeiture proceeds on grounds of prevention of imminent danger, it is not "punishment-like."
The development of "punishment-like" forfeiture is a consequence of the application of constitutional guarantees to the broad-reaching third-party forfeitures that predated the Basic Law. Before 1949 many German statutes directed forfeitures without regard to the owner's guilt or danger to the public. A forfeiture of nondangerous property belonging to an innocent third party often resulted under these statutes because of some illegal use made of the property by another. The Reich Supreme Court and the earlier commentators sought to explain these forfeitures on various grounds. Sometimes the concept of preventive forfeiture was stretched to in- elude these third-party forfeitures. 62 Other times it was said that the owner stood in a position of guarantor with respect to his property: if the owner failed to prevent the illegal use of his property, it could justly be forfeit.63 Finally, a related theory held the property itself responsible for whatever illegal use was made of it.64 With the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949, these earlier forfeiture statutes became subject to the guilt principle and to the strengthened property guarantees of Art. 14. Applying these principles, the Federal Supreme Court in 1951 rejected the old theories that had once supported the non-preventive third-party forfeitures. 65 It held that "to permit the uninvolved property owner to be held liable for the guilt of the principal or of an accessory is . . . on grounds of justice and equity only justifiable, if the facts of the case contain a particular ground of justification for such a measure."66 The Court held however that it was not necessary that the third party be guilty of a crime. An appropriate legal justification was either a preventive measure or "if the uninvolved property owner could have recognized with the exercise of requisite and justly expected care, that the principal perpetrator or an accessory would use or could have used the property in the commission of the [illegal) act .... "67 Thus arose the "punishment-like" third-party forfeiture, a criminal sanction imposed for a degree of blameworthiness, yet absent a crime by the owner.
1. "Punishment-like" Forfeiture and the Property Guarantee "Punishment-like" forfeiture can avoid the constitutional property guarantee because the misuse of property places it outside the terms of that guarantee. 68 Exactly what is sufficient misuse to overcome the property guarantee has been much discussed. That the property was used in a crime will not in itself suffice. As Eser notes, 62 [Vol. 27 to avoid the constitutional requirement merely by looking to the use of the property where the property owner is neither criminally blameworthy nor even reproachable must lead to "a complete sapping of the property guarantee."69 Rather it is the fault of the owner that allows the property guarantee to be overcome. 70 In this respect, the constitutional basis of the ''punishment-like'' forfeiture is similar to that of the punitive. 71 The Federal Supreme Court has described the degree of blameworthiness required to permit a "punishmentlike" forfeiture as reproachable conduct (vorwerjbares Verhalten).72 A general showing of bad character is not sufficient. The constitution requires a finding that the owner's blameworthy conduct contributed directly to the illegal use of the property.73 It is therefore necessary that some specific act of the owner be singled out as reproachable. 74 The 1968 reform of the forfeiture provisions of the German criminal code allows only a relatively narrow range of "punishment-like" forfeitures. "Punishment-like" forfeitures are possible only when the definition of a crime specifically refers to § 74a, which establishes the conditions for such forfeitures. That section permits ordering a "punishment-like" forfeiture only if the third-party owner:
1. at least heedlessly (leichtjertig) has contributed to the thing or right having been the means or the object of the [illegal] act or its preparation, or 2. has culpably (in verwerjlicher Weise) obtained the property with knowledge of the circumstances which would have permitted the forfeiture. 75 By heedlessness the statute requires something greater than ordinary negligence, approaching gross negligence. 76 Thus, as enacted, a "punishment-like" third-party forfeiture is permissible only if the owner has acted with near-gross negligence or has reproachably acquired the property with knowledge of a potential crime. Despite the relatively narrow scope of § 74a, Professors Baumann, Eser and 69. Eser at 224. See also Stree, supra n. 41 at 107-08. Yet, in American law "lilt is the illegal use that is the material consideration,-it is that which works the forfeiture, the guilt or innocence of its owner being accidental." J.W. Goldsmith other commentators doubt whether "punishment-like" forfeiture conforms with the guilt principle, the property guarantee and other constitutional requirements. 77 Baumann sees ''punishment-like'' forfeiture as "a type of secondary punishment of not-punishable third parties."78
Other Constitutional Problems
Critics begin, as Baumann does, with the proposition that the sanction is nothing other than a punishment. It cannot be a preventive measure; that is precluded by the requirement of blameworthiness. To the contrary, the Federal Supreme Court's own designation, "punishment-like," recognizes that the sanction is closer to punishment. Examination of the function and the goals of the "punishment-like" forfetture, the critics contend, shows that it is nothing other than punishment. "Punishment-like" forfeiture takes property for the blameworthiness of the owner as a quasi-participant in crime. 79 Eser notes that the whole tenor of the 1968 reform provisions confirm the conclusion,. since they embody a mit im Spiel gewesen ("in on the crime") approach. 80 Similarly, the goals of the "punishment-like" forfeiture are specific deterrence of the individual owner and general deterrence of the community at large, typical purposes of punishment. 81 Also, the critics rightly find the argument unpersuasive that "punishment-like" forfeiture is not punishment because the owner is not personally prosecuted. 82
If ''punishment-like'' forfeiture is seen as a punishment, it must meet all the constitutional and legal requirements of punishments generally. Foremost, "[a]n act can be punished only if it was an offence against the law before the act was committed."83 The critics ask, where is the statute establishing the property owner's of- 82. Eser calls the argument nothing more than "pure formalism," adoption of the View "that can not be, which may not be." Eser at 231. Yet, that seemed to be the view of the Federal Supreme Court in one of its first decisions in the area (creating the "punishment-like" claSSification). Judgment of 9 October 1951, 1 BGHSt 351, 353. Gilsdorf attacks the suggestion of the creation of a sui generis class of "punishmentlike" forfeitures as a compromise between expediency and constitutional principles. Gilsdorf, 1958 JZ at 689. The United States Supreme Court has adopted an argument similar to that assailed by Eser. "It is the property which is proceeded against, and ... held guilty . . . . In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, convicted and punished. The forfeiture is not part of the punishment for the criminal offense." Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1930).
83. GG Art. 103 ~ 2, translation, supra n. 45 at 56.
fense?84 Assuming the offense can be seen as established through reading the general forfeiture section of the new code in combination with the specific crime in which the property was used, the offense thus established must still be defined with specificity.85 Eser suggests that offenses so created by the new code may be void for vagueness. 86 In another direction, § 74a creates the likelihood of punishment in the absence of criminal intent, which raises further questions, viz. the guilt principle.87 While the proportionality requirement applicable to punitive forfeitures is as fully applicable to ''punishment-like'' third-party forfeiture, there is no provision to assure that the (only) "quasi-guilty" owner is treated less severely than the criminally guilty principal or accessory whose act gave rise to the forfeiture. B8 Absent such a provision, it is probable that an owner will be punished by the forfeiture of property worth considerably more than the ·ftne assessed against the criminal perpetrator. More generally, the critics charge that "punishment-like" forfeiture never really clearly establishes what the conduct is that is worthy of condemnation. 89 The property owner has committed no crime. Eser charges that the true motive of "punishment-like" forfeiture is to punish those suspected of complicity. Punishment for suspicion, he says, has no place in a constitutional state. 90 Thus the critics argue that "punishment-like" forfeiture should be dropped as contrary to constitutional principles. 91 Eser notes that in any case "punishment-like" forfeiture serves little purpose. If the owner is in fact criminally culpable he will be punishable as an accessory and the property may thus be subject to forfeiture. In other cases, the property will be subject to forfeiture as a preventive measure. C. Preventive Forfeiture
The Property Guarantee
Forfeiture of property as a preventive measure to protect society from a specific danger has been accepted with near unanimity in German law as a legitimate instrument of the legal order and as consistent with constitutional principles. 94 Perhaps for that reason it was not until the middle 1960s that it came under scrutiny for conformity with the Basic Law. The general acceptance of some form of preventive forfeiture has continued unassailed, though with some dispute as to the exact theoretical basis of the sanction. 95 Nevertheless, discussion of preventive forfeiture has not centered on its permissibility. Instead, most commentary has been directed toward the necessary constitutional limitations imposed by the property guaranty of Art. 14.
In a decision of 16 July 1965, the Federal Supreme Court stated general principles derived from Art. 14 limiting preventive forfeiture.
Each individual case must be meticulously scrutinized for whether the encroachment to meet the danger is actually appropriate (geeignet) and whether it is required (erforderlich). Only for necessary measures is there a legal justification for the state to seize private property . .. IT) he perpetrator's unlawful conduct ... alone is not yet able to justify the forfeiture. Rather, there must also be the danger of further disruptions of the lawful order through or with the forfeited object. Finally, the measure must also be in accord with the general constitutional principle of proportionality of means. 96 These three related principles-necessity (Erforderlichkeit), appropriateness (Geeignetheit) and proportionality (Verh(litnism(lSsigkeit)-are not always kept distinct in the discussion of preventive forfeitures. 97 All three are derived from the more general constitutional prohibition of excessive measures (Ubermassverbot).98 How German jurists have utilized these principles is of particular interest to the United States since American forfeitures have generally been upheld on the ground of their asserted role as preventive and regulatory measures.
It is the need of the community to protect itself from a particular danger that allows the German state to overcome the constitutional guarantee and forfeit its citizens' property. [Vol. 27
no need for such protection, there can be no justification for a preventive forfeiture. 99 The earlier law of the Federal Republic already recognized that a preventive forfeiture could be upheld only if a real danger to the community existed.1°o But under the pre-1968 law the judge was restricted in the range of actions he could take. Once he determined there was a real danger to the community he could only order a complete forfeiture or none at all; there was no middle way. To order the forfeiture would often be a greater response than necessary to protect the public, while to deny forfeiture would take insufficient account of the danger to the community. With the greater emphasis in the legal discussion of the 1960s upon the need for such a measure as a prerequisite to overcome the property guarantee, the constitutional position of such forfeitures became doubtful. Complete forfeiture could not be justified if a lesser measure would meet the public's need for protection.1 0l Accordingly, first the liberal professors' alternative draft proposal,102 and eventually the 1968 reform,103 undertook a radical departure in preventive forfeiture law. The reform mandates a more accurate determination of the need for protection and enables the judge to meet the danger with a lesser sanction than complete forfeiture of the property. The 1968 reform act takes the approach that the actual sanction ordered with respect to the property should correspond as exactly as possible to the public danger. Intrusion into the area of constitutionally protected rights will thereby be strictly limited to the minimum measure actually necessary to protect the public. This determination is to be made by the trial court. § 74b of the new code provides:
(2) In the cases of § § 74 and 74a [the general forfeiture provisions I the court shall order that the forfeiture remain reserved, and shall find a less drastic measure, if the purpose of the forfeiture can thereby be accomplished. As alternatives may be considered an order 1. to make the property unusable, 2. to remove certain fixtures or marks or otherwise alter the property, or 3. to control the property in a certain way. If the order is complied with, the reservation of the forfeiture will be at an end; otherwise the court shall at last order forfeiture. to a part of the property.t04 Complete forfeiture of property is thus the ultimate sanction to prevent danger to the public. Before resorting to it, the trial court is to consider lesser measures and to prefer those lesser measures that would be eifective. t05 For example, illegally obtained drugs need only be returned to the pharmacist, not forfeited, in order to protect the public. t06 The public is protected from unlicensed drivers when the car is taken into custody until such time as the driver gets a license; no forfeiture is necessary.107 In the case of the driver who cannot be allowed to drive at all, the danger to the public is averted when the driver has disposed of the car, though keeping the proceeds for himself. loa To be constitutional, a preventive forfeiture must not only be necessary to protect the community, it must also be appropriate and proportiona1. 109 A forfeiture or lesser similar preventive sanction is appropriate only if it will in fact serve to protect the legal interest for which it is supposedly employed. llo Here it is the responsibility of the trial judge to examine the legal interest to be protected and the danger to that interest. Similarly, a forfeiture must be considered inappropriate if it is wholly inadequate to achieve the supposed goal of protection. Thus the forfeiture of an everyday item of modest value usually cannot be justified as a preventive measure. lll Finally, the preventive measure, like the punitive, must be prop or- 110. Eser at 274-77; SchOnke-SchrOder § 40 at 486 (12th ed.). Thus the forfeiture of uncustomed goods is appropriate as a preventive measure to assure the government its revenues and to protect the public from black market goods only so long as the owner is unavailable or unwilling to pay the duty and otherwise comply with regulations. If the owner is willing to pay the duty and comply with regulations, a forfeiture of the goods is inappropriate as a preventive measure and can only be justified as punishment. Eser tionate. U2 If the danger to the community, though real, is slight, and the commercial value of the property great, the judge must deny the forfeiture. 1l3 In the reform act of 1968, to the extent that appropriateness and proportionality are dealt with by statute, they fall under the provisions of § 74b.
What Gives Rise to a Preventive Forfeiture?
Property dangerous to the community and subject to preventive forfeiture is of two types, distinguished by whether the danger exists in the abstrakt or is only relativ. 1l4 Certain property is by its nature and construction dangerous to the community. Military explosives, toxins and poisoned foods are dangerous in the abstract. In contrast, property which is ordinarily safe can become dangerous in certain circumstances. A hunting rifle is safe if owned by a responsible citizen, but is relatively dangerous in the hands of a madman. In the past, the abstract category of property dangerous regardless of circumstances has been the core of preventive forfeiture law; some commentators have suggested, without general acceptance, that preventive forfeitures should be limited to that category.U5 Professor Eser would not so limit preventive forfeiture, but would abolish the distinction between abstract and relative dangers. He correctly observes that very few objects can be said to be absolutely dangerous. u6 Instead of maintaining a strict distinction between abstract and relative, Eser would have courts look at all the circumstances, including the nature and construction of the property, the objective facts of the situation, and the personality of the criminal actor, if the actor is the owner of the property. The appropriate sanction to meet the danger so determined would then be ordered. 1l7 The 1968 reform act follows past interpretations of what constitutes a danger giving rise to a preventive forfeiture. § 74 provides that property may be forfeit if "by its nature and under the circumstances it endangers the general public or the danger exists that it will serve in the commission of further illegal acts."IlB The primary clause, that of property dangerous "by its nature and under the circumstances" encompasses both the abstract and the relative catego- ries. 119 The possibility envisioned in the secondary clause was recognized well before the 1968 reform act and requires further elaboration. 120 Forfeiting property where danger exists of further illegal use potentially gives preventive forfeiture a very broad sweep. However, the statute is not to be so widely read. 121 Emphasis must be placed on the danger of actual further illegal use. Before property ordinarily of legal use may be forfeit on account of a risk of further illegal use, the trial judge must find "tangible criteria" (konkrete Anhaltspunkte) which in their "outline" show the danger to be "already fairly clearly definable."122 A mere suspicion of some uncertain future criminal activity with the property is not sufficient.123 Eser has provided a good general statement of the widest permissible extent of preventive forfeiture: Grounds for a preventive forfeiture of property involved in the crime are made out, if on the basis of specified established facts and upon assessment of all the circumstances of the individual case, . . . the strong probability exists that the property is injuring legally protected interests or will serve in the commission of unlawful acts. 124
D. Compensation
Besides limiting the circumstances in which forfeiture may be ordered, the 1968 reform act took further steps to establish a secure constitutional foundation when forfeiture is actually ordered. The reform safeguards third parties either by continuing their rights in the property after forfeiture or by giving them compensation. § 74e of the 1975 Code includes the general rule that third-party rights shall continue notwithstanding the forfeiture,125 with two important exceptions. If the forfeiture is a preventive measure to protect the public, the court must order the extinction of all rights in the property 126 though innocent third parties will still have a claim to compensation.l 27 Moreover, the court may order the extinction of the rights of a third party who is sufficiently blameworthy to meet the requirements of a "punishment-like" forfeiture. 128 In the event the court orders a forfeiture, unaware of the rights of third parties or without a sufficient legal foundation to extinguish third-party rights, [Vol. 27 § 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted as a part of the 1968 reform, gives the third party an action to recover his property or vindicate his rightS. 129 § 74f of the Criminal Code of 1975 directs that innocent third parties be reimbursed by the state when their property or rights are taken or otherwise diminished in value in consequence of forfeiture proceedings. 130 Compensation is to be at the full commercial value of the taking or diminution. 13l Principals and accessories to the crime have no claim to compensation. l32 Their misuse of property ends the constitutional right to compensation even with preventive forfeitures. l33 Nor is the owner who has so misbehaved as to merit a "punishment-like" forfeiture entitled to reimbursement. l34 The compensation requirement is essential to a fair and effective system of preventive forfeiture. Without it the statutory scheme would probably have to choose between protecting the innocent property owner or the general public. For example, permitting forfeiture only if the owner is culpable would protect innocent owners but would leave the public exposed to dangerous property still in private possession. Allowing forfeiture whenever there is a substantial danger would protect the public, but at the expense of the innocent owner. The German solution of allowing forfeiture when there is a substantial danger to the public but requiring compensa- 132. StGB § 74f ~ 1. Cf. OWiG § 28 ~ 1. 133. Gohler, OWiG § 28 at 171. The preventive forfeiture can thus take on certain attributes of punishment, since in some cases the guilty owner will suffer the additional "penalty" of not receiving compensation where the innocent third party will. German commentators have not discussed this issue. But see Judgment of 5 November 1973, OLG Braunschweig in 1974 MDR 594 (recognizing the issue). This discrepancy will not be apparent in the case of abstractly dangerous property, since such property will be deemed without commercial value and neither the principal nor the third party will be compensated. Where the discrepancy will be evident is in the case of relatively dangerous property, particularly where the property is taken on account of the danger of further illegal use. But here the guilty principal will be protected to a certain extent by the requirements of necessity and proportionality. Moreover, Professor Eser suggests the trial judge should take this forfeiture into account in deciding the main sentence. Telephone interview with Professor Albin Eser (19 June 1977) . See Dreher § 74b at 379. See also n. 61 and accompanying text supra.
134. StGB § 74f ~ 3. Cf. OWiG § 28 ~ 2. Reimbursement is also not required if the property is subject to an uncompensated taking under some other proviSion of law. § 74f does give the guilty owner a protection not required by the Basic Law: if the forfeiture will work an unjust hardship, the owner may be compensated. StGB § 74f ~ 3. Cf. OWiG § 28 ~ 3. See Eser at 374-77. tion to the innocent owner effectively balances the public and private interests.
E. Special Forms oj Ownership
German law has ordinarily required that forfeiture as punishment is permissible only when the principal or an accessory owns the property at the time of the order. 135 This requirement was raised to constitutional rank by the Federal Supreme Court interpreting the guilt principle in the early 1950s. One consequence is that a punitive forfeiture is not permissible if the property is jointly owned and only some of the owners are guilty of the crime. 136 In that case a forfeiture is permissible only on other grounds, either as a "punishment-like" or preventive forfeiture.
The Federal Supreme Court extended the requirement of complicity of all owners to include all forms of ownership, even those that are purely formal. Thus even in the case of contingent forms of ownership, such as rights held as a secured creditor or as a conditional seller, it is necessary to establish either complicity, sufficient guilt for a "punishment-like" forfeiture or preventive grounds. 137 The Court soon recognized the undesirability of allowing the criminal to escape a punitive forfeiture merely because he had failed to make the final installment payment. Therefore the Federal Supreme Court held that a forfeiture might be declared if the state agreed beforehand to assume all the obligations of the owner-criminal to the security holder or conditional seller.1 38 A number of commentators have argued that the 1968 reform act has changed the situation with respect to the special forms of ownership just discussed. Especially Eser has argued that the new broad-reaching compensation provisions allow the courts to look only to commercial ownership of the property and to limit purely formal owners to their claim for compensation. 139 The Federal Supreme Court however has explicitly rejected Eser's position and adhered to its position under the old code. 140 But the Court has reached a basically similar result by an imaginative reading of the [Vol. 27 reform act. Before 1968 only objects could be forfeit, not rights,141 Now, under the 1968 act, rights too may be forfeit if illegally used or obtained. 142 The Federal Supreme Court interpreted this provision to allow the state to forfeit whatever right the security giver or conditional buyer has in the property. The Court adopted the theory that the owner's misuse of the object effected a misuse of his rights in the object as well. 143 Eser has criticized this approach as unnecessarily complicated and as possibly leading to future problems. l44
F. Profits of Crime
In addition to the forfeiture of property created by or used in crime, German law employs the related sanction of deprivation of profits of crime. Depriving the wrongdoer of the profits of his illegal activity is not thought to be punishment in the usual case. 145 Nor is it considered a preventive measure. Instead it is seen as a measure separate and distinct from the punitive and preventive forfeitures discussed above. The 1975 criminal code treats deprivation of the profits of crime separately from the forfeiture of the instruments and products of crime. The two sanctions are dealt with in different code sections and under different names. 146 In discussing the former sanction, commentators have pointed out the reparative effect of taking away the profits of crime. The deprivation effects a restoration of the legal order by denying the illegitimate receiver the unlawfully obtained enrichment.147 Ordinarily, only the criminal will be subject to deprivation. In appropriate circumstances however, third parties may lose property as profits of crime. Third parties can be subject to deprivation only if the criminal acted illegally on behalf of the third party or if the third party culpably accepted the profit with knowledge of the circumstances. 148 ered inappropriate. 149 In contrast, German law has considered forfeiture proceedings independent of the prosecution of the perpetrator to be the exceptional method of procedure. § 40 of the Criminal Code of 1871 specifically provided that "[ t] he forfeiture order must be pronounced in the sentence."150 Nevertheless, § 42 recognized exceptional circumstances in which an independent suit for forfeiture might be brought. "If. . . no specific person can be prosecuted or convicted, the measures [prescribed in § 40] may be imposed independently."151 When a specific person can be prosecuted, both under the old law and the new, the forfeiture was and is to be imposed in that prosecution.
A. Criminal Prosecution
If the owner of the property is not subject to prosecution, the forfeiture is to be imposed in prosecution of the principal or accessory whose acts gave rise to the circumstances allowing a forfeiture. 152 Under the law in effect until 1968, the third-party owner had no right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal defendant to protect his property. This practice was challenged in the course of reconsidering forfeiture law in light of the Basic Law. Both the Federal Supreme Court and a number of commentators expressed doubt that such third-party forfeitures conformed with the constitutional requirement that "[i]n the courts everyone shall be entitled to a hearing in accordance with law."153 Consequently in amending the substantive law of forfeiture, the drafters of the 1968 reform amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to give a third-party owner his constitutional right to be heard. 154 Under the fairly elaborate provisions enacted, the property owner is given the right of a criminal defendant with certain exceptions. 155 In case the owner does not intervene in the perpetrator's trial and the trial court has reason to believe such an owner exists, the court is required to investigate. 156 Finally, if the third party still does not have the opportunity to be heard, he is given an opportunity to bring a suit to recover his property.157
B. Independent Proceeding
Though the 1968 reform act made a number of changes in the [Vol. 27 procedure for imposing forfeiture as part of the criminal prosecution, it did not greatly change the law of the somewhat exceptional independent forfeiture proceeding. For the most part the new provisions codify judicial and scholarly interpretation of § 42 of the Criminal Code of 1871. All three varieties of forfeiture-punitive, "punishment-like," and preventive-may on some occasions be imposed in separate proceedings. 15S Use of the independent proceeding does not change the nature of the forfeiture so imposed. 159 In fact, the nature of the forfeiture significantly affects the availability of the independent proceeding; non-preventive forfeitures may be imposed in independent proceedings in a much narrower range of circumstances than preventive ones.
A non-preventive forfeiture may be imposed in an independent proceeding only when "on factual grounds no specific person can be prosecuted or convicted."160 Only such factual obstacles as make prosecution impossible without affecting the material punishability of the crime qualify.161 Thus an independent forfeiture proceeding may be maintained if the perpetrator has fled the jurisdiction or cannot be discovered,162 but not when the perpetrator-owner has died, for then there could no longer be a prosecution. 163 Nor can an independent proceeding for a punitive forfeiture be maintained when the prosecution has been abandoned or has failed. 164 In general, the legal impossibility of prosecution does not allow an independent proceeding for a punitive forfeiture. 165 If however the state attorney decides' to forego the criminal prosecution, then by explicit statutory provision, an independent proceeding may be brought.166 Assuming the prerequisites for an independent punitive forfeiture proceeding are met, the state must also prove every other material element of the crime. Thus the state cannot obtain a forfei- ture for an attempt not punishable in the criminallaw. 167 Where the state brings an independent forfeiture proceeding because it has been unable to discover the perpetrator of the crime, it must still prove that some unknown person did fulfill all the elements of the crime. 168 A preventive forfeiture may be sought in an independent proceeding whenever a personal prosecution is impossible, whether on factual or legal grounds. 169 Thus a preventive forfeiture is not precluded by a statute of limitations or by an amnesty.170 It is necessary to prove all the elements required for a preventive forfeiture in a personal prosecution. l71 SOME REMARKS ON AMERICAN LAW As noted at the outset of this comment, American courts have avoided a constitutional analysis of forfeiture law comparable to that undertaken in Germany, by reliance on a legal fiction of guilty property and supposed historical traditions of our law. Forfeiture has been treated by American courts as a unique form of sanction, completely apart from the general scheme of sanctions. Since forfeiture affects title to property, courts have held it to be necessarily in rem. If in rem, we are told it is necessarily civil in form and not punitive in effect. When the constitutionality of forfeiture has been challenged, our courts have invariably fallen back on the three positions of history, legal fiction and the supposed in rem nature of forfeiture. 172 Yet, were these the only bases for constitutionality, our courts would long ago have abolished forfeiture altogether. While history may create a presumption of constitutionality, past practice alone will never validate law. 173 Legal fiction and procedural characterization cannot even raise a presumption. But, as we have seen in examining the German law, there are a number of valid reasons to support forfeiture. Indeed, American courts in upholding our law have recognized the very same rationales relied upon in Germany. Unfortunately our courts have only incidentally referred to these rationales and have focused instead upon the illusory rationales of history, legal fiction, and procedural form. There is no better example than the 1974 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding a Puerto Rican forfeiture statute, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht [Vol. 27 Leasing CO.174 After a six-page discourse on the history of forfeiture, the Court in a single paragraph of three sentences explains what must be the true basis of American forfeiture law:
Plainly [such 1 forfeiture statutes further the punitive and deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against constitutional challenge, the application of other forfeiture statutes to the property of innocents. Forfeitures of conveyances that have been used-and may be used again-in violation of the narcotics laws fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing further illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable. To the extent that such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrong doing, confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property.175 As we have seen in German law, almost anyone of these arguments might support a particular forfeiture in a specific situation. The fiaw in the Supreme Court's analysis is that the Court raises these arguments briefly to support all forfeitures without ever showing how any single argument supports the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo. The Court does not even attempt to place this particular forfeiture within the general scheme of sanctions, as a punishment or as some other measure, and then apply the appropriate constitutional requirements to the facts of the case.
One reason for the Supreme Court's reluctance to place forfeiture into the general scheme of sanctions may be the presently unsettled divisions between the various forms of sanctions. It has become increasingly apparent that the traditional division between criminal and civil is inadequate. The civil and criminal labels tell only the form of process employed without ever describing the character of the sanction inflicted. That a suit is labeled civil does not imply that it does not impose punishment. Punishment has long been inflicted by civil process, as in tort suits assigning punitive damages, private qui tam suits, and government civil penalty actions. Yet, as Professor Clark has pointed out, the recognition of punishment in civil suits has been imperfect and the line between civil and criminal punishment unclear. 176 More imperfect still has been the division between what the U.S. Supreme Court has called punitive and remedial. Traditionally in American law, ''remedial'' corresponded to compensation for a wrong done or repair for an injury suffered. More recently however, the Supreme Court has used remedial in a broader sense when the government is plaintiff. Sanc- tions which do not strictly repair an injury may nevertheless be described as remedial in this broader sense if they protect or promote an appropriate governmental function or interest. l77 Since a multiplicity of purposes falls within the Court's use of the term "remedial," Professor Clark's choice, "nonpunishment," might appear preferable as a neutral description. In this category, whether called remedial or nonpunishment, Professor Clark has distinguished several different purposes including compensation, regulation (frequently also called prevention), taxation, and treatment. 17S For present purposes, both procedural forms of punishment, civil and criminal, may be treated together, since the choice of process should not affect the standing of a forfeiture as against the substantive constitutional guarantees of property and freedom from excessive punishment. On the other hand, it will be necessary to distinguish between the various different forms of nonpunishment, since the effect of the substantive guarantees will be different depending upon the rationale of the sanction involved. For example, a forfeiture might be upheld independently as either compensation or as regulation (prevention), but must fall if it fails to satisfy the requirements of at least one form of sanction. To test the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo then requires reference to the facts of the case, the law involved and comparison to the relevant constitutional guarantees.
The facts in Calero-Toledo were stipulated at trial in the threejudge district court. The owner, Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, was a lessor of pleasure yachts. One of its yachts under long-term lease was seized when the lessee was discovered possessing a small quantity of marijuana while on board. The lease agreement specifically prohibited the use of the yacht for unlawful purposes. The owner Pearson "did not know that its property was being used illegally for an illegal purpose and was completely innocent of the lessee's criminal act."l79 The yacht was subject to forfeiture under a Puerto Rican narcotics statute providing for forfeiture of "all conveyances . . . which are used or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate . . . possession [of a controlled substance] ."lSO On these facts, can anyone of the Supreme Court's arguments above support this particular forfeiture?
If the forfeiture is to be upheld as a punitive measure, it must be a punishment of a particular person for a specific act or failure to act. lSI The forfeiture of the yacht could be a legitimate punishment [Vol. 27 of the criminal who possessed the marijuana.l 82 That punishment of the criminal would not however explain why Pearson is penalized and not compensated. Pearson may not have been guilty ofa crime, but it must have done something or failed to do something to warrant a punitive sanction. 183 The Court said it was prepared to uphold the forfeiture of the interests of wholly innocent lessors in order to induce them "to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property." In denying Pearson compensation, the Supreme Court noted that there had been "no allegation . . . that the company did all that it reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful use."184 In other words, the Court appears to say that the forfeiture statute involved imposes an affirmative duty on citizens to guarantee that their property is not used illegally.185 Failure in that duty then supports penalizing the citizen by taking his property. But the Court does not give any indication of the source of its determination that the legislature has imposed such a duty. Assuming that eviq.ence of such a legislative intent could be found, it is doubtful that the imposition of a duty of this nature could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Perhaps the legislature might permissibly make an owner responsible for whatever use is made of particularly dangerous property, but not of ordinarily harmless property. The facts of Calero-Toledo show the absurdity of such an absolute duty. The government itself cannot keep marijuana out of its jails and army bases, where it has far more efficient means of supervision than the lessor has over his customers. The only way Pearson Yacht Leasing could assure that its property is never used for illegal purposes would be to stop leasing yachts.
If the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo cannot be upheld as a punishment, perhaps it can be endorsed as some form of "nonpunishment" (or remedial measure). The Supreme Court raises a preventive rationale when it suggests that the forfeiture serves to insure that the yacht is not put to further illegal use. But the Court does not explain why such a drastic means as forfeiture was permissible when a far less burdensome means not affecting the property rights of an innocent owner was available to protect the community. The public's need for protection would have been equally satisfied by taking the yacht from the lessee and returning it to Pearson Yacht Leasing. There was no suggestion that the particular yacht involved was more likely to be used unlawfully than any other yacht. The yacht was not specially outfitted to serve criminal purposes. There was no reason to deny the innocent yacht leasing company the return of the vessel. The mere possibility that the property might be used in the future for illegal purposes cannot be sufficient without more;186 that 182. Here it is possible that such a punishment would be excessive. 183. The failing required of Pearson may not have to be culpable, but there must be some act or failure to act that can be pointed to. See n. 181 supra.
184. 416 U.S. at 690. 185. Cf. n. 63 and accompanying text supra. 186. The necessary "something more" is not supplied by the past illegal use by the possibility exists with any property and would justify the forfeiture of any vessel or vehicle. Here there were no tangible criteria showing a probability of further illegal use. A German court looking at a similar situation would almost surely disallow the forfeiture for failure to show the requisite necessity.187 It might also question the forfeiture on proportionality grounds, since the commercial value of the yacht is great and the danger to the community of de minimis use of marijuana slight. 188 Furthermore, a German court might doubt the appropriateness of forfeiture when the vessel is merely the locale of possession and not the means. 189 In any case, even if the forfeiture could somehow be upheld as a preventive measure, a German court would require compensation to the innocent leasing company to the full commercial value of the interest taken. 190 American courts should recognize, as their German counterparts already have, that the burden of a preventive forfeiture should not fall on the innocent owner, but upon the community-at-large which, after all, the preventive forfeiture is designed to serve. Although it appears that the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo cannot be sustained on either of the two major grounds of punishment or prevention, the taking of the yacht might still be upheld on other grounds. The Supreme Court suggests that the forfeiture serves as an "economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable."191 By this the Court may mean that the forfeiture is analogous to a monetary penalty. If so, the objections to applying a punitive measure to the facts of Calero-Toledo, already discussed above, apply and the forfeiture cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the Court may be alluding to a rationale similar to that of the German sanction of deprivation of the profits of crime. 192 Yet it is hard to find profit in the mere possession of marijuana. On the facts of Calero-Toledo, it seems impossible. The only conceivable profit Pearson Yacht Leasing Company received from the crime was the portion of the rental above the company's costs paid by the lessee. In the ordinary commercial case, that percentage would be only a small fraction of the company's overall interest in the vessel. To reach that small interest can hardly justify taking the whole yacht.
In any case, Pearson's "profit from crime" is so attenuated from the criminal act that, coupled with Pearson's own total lack of complicity, it is inconceivable that any portion of the rental can qualify as a profit of crime subject to deprivation.
Finally, in a footnote, the Supreme Court suggests yet another potential rationale on which to uphold the forfeiture. The forfeiture, we are told, can serve as a valid means of compensating the government for the costs of enforcing the criminallaw. 193 Professor Clark has discussed the constitutional infirmities of requiring the criminal defendant to make such "compensation." Clark concludes that ordinary government expenses cannot be recovered as compensation, arguing that damages exceeding actual damages should be considered punitive in public law just as they are in private law. 194 In Calero-Toledo, as we have seen, punitive measures cannot be supported. Recovery of any actual damages presumably would be based on some kind of tort theory. But no theory of tort liability would allow the government compensation as claimed in Calero-Toledo. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company was not shown to have been negligent. Nor can the element of exceptional danger necessary to strict liability be found in Pearson's ordinary leasing of yachts. On either theory of liability, Pearson cannot be shown to have been the legal cause of damage suffered by the government. Nor can the value of the yacht be shown to relate to the damages suffered. The difficulties present in Calero-Toledo are not unusual; they are apt to arise in any compensatory forfeiture suit. Thus, although a forfeiture might theoretically be upheld as a compensatory measure, it is unlikely that in practice any such scheme could ever be satisfactory.
In conclusion, while in Calero-Toledo the Supreme Court raised valid reasons to support some forfeitures, the Court failed to justify ordering the forfeiture in the case before it. The Court should reconsider its decision. It should begin a restructuring of American forfeiture law based upon analysis of each individual forfeiture against the rationale raised to support it. The Court should recognize, as its German counterpart did a quarter century ago, that forfeiture can be justified in a constitutional state only if based upon the culpable conduct of the owner or upon a real danger to the community.
193. 416 U.S. at 687 n. 26. 194 . Clark, supra n. 176, at 469-75. 
